Nato official: 'We depend on the US, without them, there is no alternative'

Javier Colomina is the Nato secretary general's special representative for the southern neighbourhood.

Colomina, who joined the alliance in 2017, reflects on how US president Donald Trump's criticism of Nato and his friction with some allies have shaken the confidence of many Europeans in the transatlantic bond.

What do you say to Europeans on behalf of the alliance?

In the many years I have been involved in diplomacy, I have never seen such an unstable moment in international relations. That is why Nato now plays a more important role than ever in guaranteeing stability and prosperity in the Atlantic region. The number of threats and challenges has increased dramatically in recent years. If Nato is not relevant in these circumstances, I cannot imagine when it will be. 

Trump has cast doubt upon the US’ commitment to the alliance. How strong is the transatlantic bond?

I fully understand that there is anxiety and a degree of distress in Europe. We have all read, heard and seen things that we do not like. But the reality is that in all the meetings we have had behind closed doors with various US officials, from president Trump to his national security advisor and various secretaries, they have all confirmed their commitment to a strong Nato and to Article 5.

What they have insisted on is that our financial contributions have to change, with Europe putting in more. Yet what the US puts in is still absolutely essential. It is so essential that today there is no alternative. Why would we look for alternatives to something that has worked for 75 years? We have to ensure it continues to work in spite of everything.

Would a Nato without the United States make sense?

No. It would lose its raison d’être, its essence. Nato depends on the US in essential areas. Without them, it would be something else, something that, in my opinion, would not work. What we must do now is work on strengthening Nato’s European pillar. The US provides military capabilities that only they have and the nuclear umbrella, which is the essence of our deterrent. The only European country with autonomous nuclear capability is France, but it is limited in size. The UK has a nuclear capability linked to and dependent on the US. Only the US has the capacity to use nuclear deterrence, due to the size and sophistication of its arsenal, against other nuclear powers with similar capacities, which include Russia and, in a few years’ time, probably China. Would we Europeans be capable of generating our own nuclear deterrent capacity? It would be complicated and would open up a lot of national debates.

How is the European pillar of Nato doing right now? Could it take on continental security in the event of an eventual withdrawal of US troops?

The withdrawal of US troops was a threat that president Trump repeated a lot during the election campaign. But to date, we have not seen any indication that this will happen. And the movement of troops in the quantities that were discussed during the election campaign would require many months of preparation. It is true that there is a large American presence in Europe. 

In some places they fulfil an absolutely strategic function of projecting American, as is the case in Spain, Italy or northern Europe. But in other cases there could perhaps be a withdrawal of a limited number of soldiers to fulfil their own electoral promises. But I repeat, there is no sign, no signal that this is going to happen for now.

'The analysis of our military needs made it clear that more than two percent was needed'

Could Europe take charge of maintaining a ceasefire in Ukraine?

Europeans are currently working very seriously on providing security guarantees for Ukraine, which could take the form of a security force. Some countries estimate that around 20,000 and 30,000 soldiers would be necessary; others estimate that it would be more like 50,000 or 100,000, depending on the functions and objectives of that force. In any case, we believe that they will need the US to contribute in some way. There are parts of US support that are irreplaceable. The deterrent capacity that we have already talked about, but also aspects that would be essential for a mission on the ground, such as intelligence, command and control, logistics, and facilitators.

Europe would probably find it difficult to deploy, for example, 100,000 troops in Ukraine without affecting its capacity to deploy them on other fronts. It is therefore necessary for Nato to remain involved in any ongoing talks. The Europeans are doing what they have to do, led by France and the United Kingdom. But it is important to have an overview of all our threats so that our collective defence is not compromised.

The annual Nato summit will be held from 24-26 June in The Hague. What are the key items on the agenda?

It is still early days, and the allies will have to sit down and discuss the agenda for the next summit. Moreover, the new US administration is not yet fully formed. But it will be difficult for the main issues not to be Ukraine, industry and investment in defence. Especially the latter aspect. At the Washington Summit, when president Biden was still in office, the US made it clear that two percent (of GDP allocated to defence) was a floor and not a ceiling. The analysis of our military needs made it clear that more than two percent was needed.

How much more?

It will be closer to three percent than to two percent, possibly above three percent. But there will be negotiations, which will not be easy, about the figure itself, and how that figure is calculated, what components it has, what type of contributions and equipment.

'I am convinced that we will live with this instability in the Sahel for the next decade and that these threats will in turn push the Maghreb into greater fragility'

Countries like Spain have long criticised the Nato formula for measuring defence output. So, will it be possible to change it?

It is impossible to know what that new formula will contain, but it will possibly have new elements. The verticals that have existed since the [2014] Wales summit will be maintained and I would not be surprised if the calculation will be refined a little so that everyone feels comfortable. The figure of three percent is not only complicated for Spain, but also for many others such as Italy or Canada. France is at two percent and going up to three percent would mean going from approximately €50bn to €75bn. The British themselves, one of the major countries most committed to defence investment, have announced 2.5 percent, and three percent in only a few years’ time, which may not be enough either. We’ll see how the conversation goes. What we do have to try to do is reach two percent before the summit and this is a message that the secretary-general has clearly conveyed to all his counterparts.

Before?

Before the summit or, at least, within 2025. That is what the EU itself is calling for. The plan seems clear. There is €150bn that would come from the European institutions, the details are not yet known. But the remaining €650bn is money that has to come from the member states. Brussels is saying: you have to spend more than two percent. That alone would add tens of billions of euros from countries that have not yet reached that threshold. That would already be a very significant step forward. From there, we must continue to plan investment in defence to meet the capability goals that we ourselves have agreed within the Nato framework.

The European Union has its own plan for rearmament. Do the EU and Nato have parallel strategies? Can there be cooperation?

There must be cooperation. We have a very good relationship with the European Union. Secretary general Rutte was the Dutch prime minister and sat on the European Council for 14 years. He knows his colleagues and the structures of the European Union very well. The programme launched by the European Commission has to form part of the transatlantic strategy. More than an alternative, it should complement transatlantic capabilities, particularly North American capabilities.

'It is clear that decisions such as the withdrawal of USAID will have a significant impact on the West’s presence in the Global South'

Last year you were appointed the secretary general’s special envoy for the southern neighbourhood, what we call the ‘Southern Flank’, one of the greatest security challenges for Spain. What is the situation and how do you see it evolving?

I am convinced that we will live with this instability in the Sahel for the next decade and that these threats will in turn push the Maghreb into greater fragility. This is already reaching the Mediterranean and will continue to affect us directly in terms of terrorism, illegal migration and all kinds of illicit trafficking. Many of the bad things that happen in the world happen on a terrible scale in the Sahel and there is hardly any territorial control by the state in many of the Sahelian countries.

It will therefore be important that the countries that pushed hardest for the southern Flank to be recognised as a priority, specifically Spain, Italy and Portugal, together with the other allies who are now convinced of this, continue to promote its importance. 

It is true that the threats in the east, and specifically that of Russia, are the most imminent from the conventional point of view. But it is also true that the countries in that region are a little more insistent on the threat facing them than we in the south are, where we have less of a ‘culture’ around defence and security.

The strategic withdrawal of the US could also rekindle old grievances and vendettas, encourage warlords or allow strategic rivals to enter the playing field, such as Russia or China. Are we prepared?

There are countless factors that lead to crises like the one facing the Sahel. But one important one was that the West decided to take a step back and when that happens, Russia is usually waiting as well as, increasingly, China or Iran. And these countries don’t take steps back. On the contrary, when they see that we do, they stay there, waiting at the door and willing to come in with whatever is necessary.

Let’s not fool ourselves: the US is the country with the greatest capacity for global geostrategic presence. And while the US has much greater military capacity and hard power than we do, in soft power the gap is twice as wide. It is clear that decisions such as the withdrawal of USAID will have a significant impact on the West’s presence in the Global South. It is important that the US remains committed, and work will have to be done on aspects and angles of foreign policy and defence that are sufficiently relevant and fit in with US national priorities, such as the fight against terrorism, Iran or China. Possibly the American approach will become more transactional, less altruistic, so to speak; but their commitment is essential for the work we can do in Nato with our southern neighbourhood.

Are we at risk of overreacting?

There is a lot of noise these days, and of course, it makes it very difficult to make decisions and see the situation clearly, particularly when we hear things that are unacceptable or difficult to digest. But we have to stay focused on what is essential, and for us, the transatlantic link is essential. It is understandable, given that citizens and politicians live in the immediate, in electoral cycles, and therefore respond to impulses much faster than a security and defence strategy requires.

In the field of geostrategy and defence, a longer-term view is taken. The cycles of the defence industry, for example, are very long. From a military and security point of view, it makes little sense to make plans for three or four years. We must try to keep our feet on the ground.

This article is part of the PULSE collaborative project. The original article was published on the Spanish news outlet El Confidencial.