Trailing in the polls, who will Orban's scapegoat be at 2026 election?

When elections draw near, authoritarian leaders hiding behind a thin facade of democracy frequently resort to fabricating 'enemies' against whom they can contrast themselves as solution-finders and saviours.

They blame foreign forces and allege plots to undermine national stability, security, and traditions.

It is a well-worn tactic, and one in which Hungary’s Viktor Orbán is particularly well versed.

Since reclaiming office in 2010, the Hungarian premier’s ruling Fidesz-KDNP coalition has routinely conjured illusory adversaries for political gain.

In 2014, the external enemy was “foreign entities”, seeking to “assert their authority” over ordinary Hungarians.

In 2018, it was the Hungarian-born American philanthropist, George Soros, who was portrayed prominently on billboards, leaflets and across government-allied media channels, as plotting a “full frontal” attack on the Hungarian state.

And, in 2022, it was civil society and independent media, who were accused of working hand-in-glove with US allies to “manipulate” global press reporting of developments in Hungary.

In just over a year from now, the county’s citizens will again give their verdict at the ballot box.

Opinion polls suggest an insurgent party, fronted by Péter Magyar, could topple the prime minister. Magyar's TISZA has gained significant ground over the past year, achieving impressive results from a standing start at the 2024 European Parliament elections, and growing public support for a campaign that centres on the need to clean-up Hungary’s political system. 

The insider turns on Orbán

For Orbán, Magyar poses a new and troubling problem.

Unlike previous opponents, who have been targeted on the basis of their political background, or association with critical institutions, Magyar is one of the Fidesz family. He was married to Orbán’s former justice minister, Judit Varga, and was a long-time ally of the governing elite. His breakout into a politician who could realistically depose Orbán in 2026 has rendered offensive action, which worked in previous election cycles, incompatible or ineffective. 

Still, in recent weeks, the Fidesz propaganda machine has tried, and failed, to charge Magyar and others — “bought politicians, judges, journalists, fake NGOs, and political activists” — of plotting to “overthrow Hungarian democracy”.

These campaigns, which are orchestrated through a network of government-aligned media — which account for the majority of the country’s information space — have sought to smear Magyar as a “puppet” of foreign forces.

In his annual state of the union address, in February, Orbán labelled him and others as “stink bugs [that] survived the winter”, and vowed to “dismantle” their financial machinery.

But attacks on scapegoats — a smokescreen routinely deployed to divert public frustration away from issues, such as a floundering economy and creaking health service — are not landing as previously.

While Soros continues to be central to Fidesz-KDNP propaganda, the reality is Soros is now 94 years-old, has largely withdrawn from the public eye, and is no longer a voter-driver he once was for the ruling coalition.

Recent victims of government assault and misinformation, including European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, and European People’s Party group leader, Manfred Weber, have also failed to resonate — and, indeed, belie the fact that most Hungarians are pro-European and overwhelmingly favour continued EU membership.

Attacks on the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, in the context of EU funding and security, are similarly failing to peel voters away from Magyar’s movement.

This has led an increasingly desperate Orbán to widen his attack, and lean, further, into more extreme — and increasingly authoritarian — tactics in a bid to cling to power.

The creation and subsequent harnessing of a government institution — the National Sovereignty Office — to target political opponents, independent media outlets, NGOs, and other critical voices, evidences the trajectory of the ruling coalition ahead of the campaign proper.

The prime minister’s leveraging of the suspension of USAID development funds to portray independent media in Hungary as a corruption imbroglio, and fuel animosity towards foreign-funded journalists and activists, has further raised concerns among Hungarians about just how far he is prepared to go to maintain his rule, and whether the country’s already diminished democratic apparatus can survive further assault. 

Whether Orbán is prepared to go all-out, and countenance the subversion of democracy, remains to be seen.

However, investigations by the independent news site, Direkt36, show a coordinated and, troublingly, deep-rooted and ominous network of self-aggrandisement and preservation-building. This extends beyond Hungary’s borders, and includes coordination with Europe’s radical right and autocratic leaders of the east, in the form of asset laundering, and intermediary financing of parties of the Patriots grouping at the European Parliament. 

Germany's Merz already on the case

The EU, which, for years, has kicked the 'Orbán problem' into the long grass, could face a moment of peril in 2026.

If it stands by, and allows the Hungarian premier to further erode and hijack his country’s democracy, we could well see total state capture play out in an EU member state.

The incoming German chancellor Friedrich Merz, has already sensed this danger and, in recent weeks, called on the bloc to be more “consistent” in its application of “infringement proceedings”.

Roughly €22bn in European funds — equal to 11 percent of Hungary’s estimated GDP in 2024 — have been withheld from Orban’s government, in response to ongoing rule-of-law breaches.

This is leverage that must continue to be used to ensure that the 2026 election is fought in a free manner.

Another avenue of strength, from a European perspective, lies in curtailing Hungary’s voting rights at the European Council. The European Parliament initiated efforts to this end in 2018, and, as Mertz and others have since suggested, this is something that should be revisited as a means of preventing further democratic vandalism in Hungary. 

The next 12 months will be critical for Hungarians and those of the wider European project.

Clear-sighted interventions, by the EU and other democrats of the international community, have the potential to restrain Orbán, ensure the country’s parliamentary elections are fought in a cleaner information space, and, crucially, thwart any plotted efforts to subvert democracy in a European member state.