The legal and moral failings of Meloni's Albania deportation deal

The border externalisation strategy promoted by Italy's Georgia Meloni government represents a political and legal failure, highlighting the contradictions of a hardline rhetoric against irregular immigration.

Since coming to power, the government has promised an uncompromising defense of Italy’s borders.

However, this ambition has translated into an attempt to shift the management of migration outside national borders through agreements such as the one signed with Albania. Presented as an innovative solution, this strategy faces significant legal and practical limitations, raising serious questions about its compliance with European and international law while proving ineffective and counterproductive.

The Italy-Albania protocol, signed on 6 November 2023, commits Albania to providing land free of charge for five years, where Italy has built, at its own expense, facilities for the detention of migrants.

These facilities include hotspots for rapid processing and repatriation centers for deportation.

Migrants detained in these centres would be subject to procedures under Italian law: if their asylum requests were approved, they would be transferred to Italy; if denied, they would be deported.

However, if deportation was not possible within 18 months, the migrants would still be returned to Italy.

The protocol explicitly excludes the possibility of migrants remaining in Albania, creating an evident contradiction: either migrants violate the agreement by attempting to escape, or the centre would have the same effect as a facility located in Italy, but with significantly higher costs.

Beyond these operational shortcomings, the protocol raises serious legal issues and lacks adequate guarantees for migrants.

The absence of clear provisions for transportation and compliance with European legal procedures conflicts with standards established by the European Court of Human Rights, as in the Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy case, which prohibits migration procedures without proper legal safeguards.

Furthermore, independent reports have documented discriminatory treatment of asylum seekers in Albania, compounded by often inhumane conditions in detention centres.

This approach, beyond violating fundamental rights, subjects individuals to the trauma of detention, even if they ultimately end up being admitted to Italy.

ECJ ruling throws spanner in the works

The recent ruling by the European Court of Justice has further complicated the Italian government’s position. The court determined that a country can only be considered "safe" if safety is guaranteed uniformly across its entire territory.

This interpretation led the Rome Tribunal to invalidate the detention in Albania of 12 asylum seekers from countries like Bangladesh and Egypt, which do not meet the criteria for being deemed safe.

Judges ordered the transfer of these migrants to Italy, confirming that border externalisation cannot be used as a pretext to circumvent obligations under European law.

While Italy's externalisation strategy faces mounting challenges, it is worrying to see other European countries showing interest in adopting similar approaches.

The UK, under Labour prime minister Keir Starmer, has expressed keen interest in learning from Meloni's policies.

During a recent visit to Rome, Starmer praised Italy's "remarkable progress" in curbing migration flows and combating smuggling networks.

Following a tragic shipwreck in the English Channel, which claimed the lives of eight migrants, Starmer expressed a desire to replicate agreements like those between Italy and Albania to manage migration more effectively.

This marks a significant departure from his previous criticisms of the Conservative government's controversial Rwanda deportation plan, which he had dismissed as a "costly gimmick."

While the Rwanda plan was ultimately ruled illegal by British courts, Starmer's interest in externalisation agreements raises questions about the direction of UK migration policy and its potential alignment with Italy's contentious model.

This policy also fails to address long-term implications.

The agreement with Albania is limited to five years. What will happen afterward?

Additionally, if EU candidate countries like Albania are pressured to manage part of Europe’s asylum procedures, it becomes difficult to imagine how they could resist increasing demands from the EU, given their reliance on European support for accession processes.

The idea of outsourcing asylum procedures beyond EU borders not only represents a false solution but also risks setting a precedent that other countries — or even the EU itself — could adopt, with high costs and no tangible impact on the structural issues of migration.

The construction of the Gjadër centre cost €60m, and its maintenance generates significant expenses, including for police, prison staff, medical personnel, and other officials.

Even while inactive, the centre continues to incur high operational costs to prevent its deterioration, while the operation of the transfer ship costs approximately €15,000 per day. This expensive policy is not only unsustainable but also proves ineffective in achieving its stated objectives.

Thus, the strategy of border externalisation benefits neither asylum seekers nor the implementing countries nor the transit countries, while severely undermining the fundamental principles of European law.

When will governments finally focus on real solutions, such as equitable distribution among member states and expedited, efficient procedures? Only through respect for human rights and legal norms can the challenges of migration be addressed with seriousness and responsibility.