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Fumio Kishida, then Japanese PM, with Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel in 2023. In an unprecedented move for postwar Japan, Kishida approved the provision of lethal weapons to victims of aggression (Photo: European Commission)

Opinion

What does the new EU-Japan defence partnership actually mean?

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Japan has become the first country in the Indo-Pacific to strike a security and defence partnership with the European Union. 

In one of his final acts as the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell concluded what he described as the “historical and very timely” agreement last November with Japan’s foreign minister, Takeshi Iwaya. The landmark deal reached in Tokyo coincides with the new strategic partnership agreement between Japan and the EU that took effect on 1 January 2025. 

The latest developments in EU-Japan relations are somewhat surprising for the northeast Asian country, which has attached a deep level of importance to its postwar alliance with the US. But they reflect Japan’s desire to become a major power in its own right within a new world of geopolitical competition. 

Japan has been preparing itself to play an active role in global affairs in recent years after more than half a century of isolation and pacifism.

The late Shinzo Abe — the country’s longest-serving prime minister — implemented consequential institutional reforms that included the creation of Japan’s first-ever National Security Council in 2013. These changes enabled Abe’s successors to consolidate Japan as a strong and independent actor capable of standing up for democracy and the rule of law in the world. 

Since 1945, Japan has sought to maintain peaceful foreign relations. The country pursued engagement with Russia notwithstanding the annexation of Crimea in 2014 in light of the long-standing dispute over the Kuril Islands off the northeast Japanese coast.

But Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 prompted Japan to change its foreign policy. Fumio Kishida - who served as Japan’s prime minister from 2021 to 2024 — reacted with boldness to the all-out Russian assault.

Ukraine U-turn

In December 2022, Kishida updated his country’s National Security Strategy to recognise Russia as a threat to "the very foundations of the rules that shape the international order."

In an unprecedented move for postwar Japan, Kishida approved the provision of lethal weapons to victims of aggression. This included the Patriot surface-to-air missiles that have been instrumental to the Ukrainian counter-offensive.

Japan’s support for Ukraine is backed up with a reorientation of its postwar military posture. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution that renounced war as a sovereign right had left Japan heavily dependent on the US for its security.

Kishida made a dramatic change to this constraint on Japan’s power by authorising its counter-strike capability. This is supplemented with a long-term plan to increase defence spending. Japan is on course to become the third-largest military spender globally in 2027, following the US and China. 

In an unprecedented move for postwar Japan, Kishida approved the provision of lethal weapons to victims of aggression

But Russia’s war against Ukraine alone does not account for Japan’s new-found assertiveness in foreign policy. Rather, it has been a primary goal of the Japanese leadership to defend the rules-based international order that has allowed their country to prosper after the devastation of the Second World War. 

The security of Europe and of the Indo-Pacific are becoming increasingly interlinked as Russia and North Korea start to collaborate with one other. The deployment of North Korean soldiers in Russia indicates that a shared long-term interest exists between Moscow and Pyongyang to challenge US primacy in international affairs. In response, Japan looks to its alliances as a critical mechanism with which it can advance its core national interests.

Kishida has devoted particular attention to Japan’s security cooperation with the US in order to maintain the global balance of power. Last spring, his government reached an agreement with the Biden administration to improve bilaterally the respective Japanese and American command and control architectures. This strengthens the US-Japan alliance by allowing for greater interoperability between their armed forces and enhancing Japanese defence capabilities. 

Japan’s multilateralism extends beyond its ties with Washington. When it returned to the international community in 1956 as a new member of the United Nations, Japan reaffirmed its belief in the principles of free and open cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Kishida applied these fundamental values to Japan’s G7 presidency in 2023.

The Japanese premier placed a strong emphasis on building coalitions with the world’s emerging power centres in support of Ukraine. Japan’s relations with South Korea had been deteriorating over historical grievances, which undermined regional stability. But Kishida’s inclusive approach to diplomacy secured a historic rapprochement between Tokyo and Seoul.

Japan has also built strong relations with key global players outside of its immediate neighbourhood.

While responding differently to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Japan and India have worked together to keep the Indo-Pacific a free and open region. Kishida and his Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, reaffirmed their countries’ "special strategic and global partnership" in a summit held in New Delhi in March 2022. 

Japan’s investment in sustaining the post-1945 order is a timely strategic asset for the EU. The process of European integration faces a revisionist threat from Russia with the implicit backing of China and an uncertain US presence in Europe. 

In this new geopolitical landscape, further engagement with Japan’s growing importance on the world stage will be vital.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this opinion piece are the author’s, not those of EUobserver

Author Bio

Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a non-resident associate research fellow from the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in Prague.

Fumio Kishida, then Japanese PM, with Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel in 2023. In an unprecedented move for postwar Japan, Kishida approved the provision of lethal weapons to victims of aggression (Photo: European Commission)

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Author Bio

Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a non-resident associate research fellow from the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in Prague.

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