Tonight's US presidential election has significant implications not only for American voters but also for the future of the EU-US relations, especially in the context of European defence.
Many analysts suggest that Kamala Harris and Donald Trump represent two contrasting doctrines of US foreign policy. While this may be true regarding the war in Ukraine, the differences are less clear when it comes to European affairs, particularly the integration of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
Regarding the war in Ukraine, it is expected that Kamala Harris will continue the policy of the Biden administration.
Both she and her running mate, Tim Walz, are staunch supporters of Ukraine. So far, the US has committed over $55bn [€50.5bn] in security assistance and $175bn in financial aid to support Ukraine’s defence efforts.
The Democratic Party leadership believes that the Russian economy cannot sustain its war effort much longer, and a negotiated peace treaty may eventually be inevitable.
Under her administration, it will not be surprising to see an increase in both military and financial support for Ukraine to intensify pressure on Russia. However, Harris recognises that post-war borders will likely differ from those in 1991.
In contrast, Trump has repeatedly stated that he opposes continued aid to Ukraine, arguing that it is unrealistic for Ukraine to fully recover territories seized by Russia.
If elected, he has suggested prioritizing mediation efforts between the conflicting parties, even at the risk of straining US-Ukraine relations. It is worth noting that Trump maintained relatively good relations with Russia during his presidency.
Furthermore, he frequently expressed his wish to end the US's ‘endless wars’ in the Middle East, including Afghanistan (despite criticising the manner in which the withdrawal was executed).
Despite these claims, a rapid deal with Russia under Trump remains uncertain, as opposition from the US military establishment and other institutional actors would likely be significant.
Furthermore, Trump has a history of overpromising on foreign policy matters, as seen in his 2016 campaign pledges to quickly resolve complex international issues. So, it is not very certain that under his presidency we will see a swift solution.
While their views on Russia differ, Harris and Trump’s approaches to European defence integration show more continuity than contrast. Many analysts emphasise the differences between Nato and the EU, often implying that EU member states present a unified front toward US defence demands.
This view is partially accurate, especially regarding Nato's pressure on European countries to meet the two percent of GDP defence spending target and Trump’s often exaggerated threats to withdraw US support for Nato members failing to meet their financial commitments.
The war in Ukraine has certainly increased the importance of European defence in the agenda of policymakers, but the European security architecture does not include only the CSDP and Nato.
Disagreements between leaders of the EU member states about financing defence armaments programmes stagnate further the integration of the CSDP, while multilateral agreements, such as the Lancaster House Treaty between the UK and France, and organisations like the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR), contribute to the complex web of European defence structures.
Regardless of who wins tonight, the US will likely continue navigating these complexities to maintain Nato's central role in European defence, particularly in the realm of defence procurement.
A recent example of this strategy is the June 2023 Memorandum of Understanding between the Nato Support and Procurement Agency and OCCAR, which strengthens OCCAR’s position in armaments cooperation at the expense of the European Defence Agency (EDA), an EU framework meant to support the integration of the CSDP.
The disparity in their budgets speaks volumes: in 2023, OCCAR managed €6bn for 20 projects, while the EDA’s total budget stood at a mere €44m.
With OCCAR’s member countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK) accounting for more than 80 percent of the EU’s defence budget, such agreements make it challenging to persuade key EU members to increase investments in the EDA or expand OCCAR to include smaller EU states with less competitive defence industries.
Similarly, the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a grouping of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, is enhancing its collaboration with Nato, further complicating efforts to strengthen the EU’s defence posture through frameworks like PESCO.
So, despite Ursula von der Leyen’s aspirations to create a European Defense Union, significant support from the US remains unlikely, no matter who will be in the White House.
The next US administration will likely continue exploiting (or even amplifying) competition among Europe’s various defence frameworks, making the goal of EU strategic autonomy a difficult and distant prospect.
Christos Kourtelis is assistant professor at Panteion University in Athens. Spyros Lymperis studies politics and international relations at Panteion University.
Christos Kourtelis is assistant professor at Panteion University in Athens. Spyros Lymperis studies politics and international relations at Panteion University.